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Abstract
Kernel methods are an extremely popular set of techniques used for many important machine learning and
data analysis applications. In addition to having good practical performance, these methods are supported by
a well-developed theory. Kernel methods use an implicit mapping of the input data into a high dimensional
feature space defined by a kernel function, i.e., a function returning the inner product between the images
of two data points in the feature space. Central to any kernel method is the kernel matrix, which is built by
evaluating the kernel function on a given sample dataset.
In this paper, we initiate the study of non-asymptotic spectral theory of random kernel matrices. These
are n × n random matrices whose (i, j)th entry is obtained by evaluating the kernel function on xi and xj ,
where x1, . . . ,xn are a set of n independent random high-dimensional vectors. Our main contribution is to
obtain tight upper bounds on the spectral norm (largest eigenvalue) of random kernel matrices constructed by
commonly used kernel functions based on polynomials and Gaussian radial basis.
As an application of these results, we provide lower bounds on the distortion needed for releasing the coef-
ficients of kernel ridge regression under attribute privacy, a general privacy notion which captures a large class
of privacy definitions. Kernel ridge regression is standard method for performing non-parametric regression
that regularly outperforms traditional regression approaches in various domains. Our privacy distortion lower
bounds are the first for any kernel technique, and our analysis assumes realistic scenarios for the input, unlike
all previous lower bounds for other release problems which only hold under very restrictive input settings.
1 Introduction
In recent years there has been significant progress in the development and application of kernel methods for many
practical machine learning and data analysis problems. Kernel methods are regularly used for a range of problems
such as classification (binary/multiclass), regression, ranking, and unsupervised learning, where they are known
to almost always outperform “traditional” statistical techniques [23, 24]. At the heart of kernel methods is the
notion of kernel function, which is a real-valued function of two variables. The power of kernel methods stems
from the fact for every (positive definite) kernel function it is possible to define an inner-product and a lifting
(which could be nonlinear) such that inner-product between any two lifted datapoints can be quickly computed
using the kernel function evaluated at those two datapoints. This allows for introduction of nonlinearity into the
traditional optimization problems (such as Ridge Regression, Support Vector Machines, Principal Component
Analysis) without unduly complicating them.
The main ingredient of any kernel method is the kernel matrix, which is built using the kernel function,
evaluated at given sample points. Formally, given a kernel function κ : X ×X → R and a sample set x1, . . . ,xn,
the kernel matrix K is an n × n matrix with its (i, j)th entry Kij = κ(xi,xj). Common choices of kernel
functions include the polynomial kernel (κ(xi,xj) = (a〈xi,xj〉 + b)p, for p ∈ N) and the Gaussian kernel
(κ(xi,xj) = exp(−a‖xi − xj‖2), for a > 0) [23, 24].
In this paper, we initiate the study of non-asymptotic spectral properties of random kernel matrices. A
random kernel matrix, for a kernel function κ, is the kernel matrix K formed by n independent random vectors
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x1, . . . ,xn ∈ Rd. The prior work on random kernel matrices [13, 2, 6] have established various interesting
properties of the spectral distributions of these matrices in the asymptotic sense (as n, d → ∞). However,
analyzing algorithms based on kernel methods typically requires understanding of the spectral properties of
these random kernel matrices for large, but fixed n, d. A similar parallel also holds in the study of the spectral
properties of “traditional” random matrices, where recent developments in the non-asymptotic theory of random
matrices have complemented the classical random matrix theory that was mostly focused on asymptotic spectral
properties [27, 20].
We investigate upper bounds on the largest eigenvalue (spectral norm) of random kernel matrices for poly-
nomial and Gaussian kernels. We show that for inputs x1, . . . ,xn drawn independently from a wide class of
probability distributions over Rd (satisfying the subgaussian property), the spectral norm of a random kernel ma-
trix constructed using a polynomial kernel of degree p, with high probability, is roughly bounded byO(dpn). In a
similar setting, we show that the spectral norm of a random kernel matrix constructed using a Gaussian kernel is
bounded byO(n), and with high probability, this bound reduces toO(1) under some stronger assumptions on the
subgaussian distributions. These bounds are almost tight. Since the entries of a random kernel matrix are highly
correlated, the existing techniques prevalent in random matrix theory can not be directly applied. We overcome
this problem by careful splitting and conditioning arguments on the random kernel matrix. Combining these with
subgaussian norm concentrations form the basis of our proofs.
Applications. Largest eigenvalue of kernel matrices plays an important role in the analysis of many machine
learning algorithms. Some examples include, bounding the Rademacher complexity for multiple kernel learn-
ing [16], analyzing the convergence rate of conjugate gradient technique for matrix-valued kernel learning [26],
and establishing the concentration bounds for eigenvalues of kernel matrices [12, 25].
In this paper, we focus on an application of these eigenvalue bounds to an important problem arising while
analyzing sensitive data. Consider a curator who manages a database of sensitive information but wants to release
statistics about how a sensitive attribute (say, disease) in the database relates with some nonsensitive attributes
(e.g., postal code, age, gender, etc). This setting is widely considered in the applied data privacy literature,
partly since it arises with medical and retail data. Ridge regression is a well-known approach for solving these
problems due to its good generalization performance. Kernel ridge regression is a powerful technique for building
nonlinear regression models that operate by combining ridge regression with kernel methods [21].1 We present
a linear reconstruction attack2 that reconstructs, with high probability, almost all the sensitive attribute entries
given sufficiently accurate approximation of the kernel ridge regression coefficients. We consider reconstruction
attacks against attribute privacy, a loose notion of privacy, where the goal is to just avoid any gross violation of
privacy. Concretely, the input is assumed to be a database whose ith row (record for individual i) is (xi, yi) where
xi ∈ Rd is assumed to be known to the attacker (public information) and yi ∈ {0, 1} is the sensitive attribute,
and a privacy mechanism is attribute non-private if the attacker can consistently reconstruct a large fraction of
the sensitive attribute (y1, . . . , yn). We show that any privacy mechanism that always adds ≈ o(1/(dpn)) noise3
to each coefficient of a polynomial kernel ridge regression model is attribute non-private. Similarly any privacy
mechanism that always adds ≈ o(1) noise3 to each coefficient of a Gaussian kernel ridge regression model is
attribute non-private. As we later discuss, there exists natural settings of inputs under which these kernel ridge
regression coefficients, even without the privacy constraint, have the same magnitude as these noise bounds,
implying that privacy comes at a steep price. While the linear reconstruction attacks employed in this paper
themselves are well-known [9, 15, 14], these are the first attribute privacy lower bounds that: (i) are applicable
to any kernel method and (ii) work for any d-dimensional data, analyses of all previous attacks (for other release
1We provide a brief coverage of the basics of kernel ridge regression in Section 4.
2In a linear reconstruction attack, given the released information ρ, the attacker constructs a system of approximate linear equalities
of the form Az ≈ ρ for a matrix A and attempts to solve for z.
3Ignoring the dependence on other parameters, including the regularization parameter of ridge regression.
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problems) require d to be comparable to n. Additionally, unlike previous reconstruction attack analyses, our
bounds hold for a wide class of realistic distributional assumptions on the data.
1.1 Comparison with Related Work
In this paper, we study the largest eigenvalue of an n×n random kernel matrix in the non-asymptotic sense. The
general goal with studying non-asymptotic theory of random matrices is to understand the spectral properties
of random matrices, which are valid with high probability for matrices of a large fixed size. This is contrast
with the existing theory on random kernel matrices which have focused on the asymptotics of various spectral
characteristics of these random matrices, when the dimensions of the matrices tend to infinity. Let x1, . . . ,xn ∈
Rd be n i.i.d. random vectors. For any F : Rd × Rd × R → R, symmetric in the first two variables, consider
the random kernel matrix K with (i, j)th entry Kij = F (xi,xj , d). El Karoui [13] considered the case where K
is generated by either the inner-product kernels (i.e., F (xi,xj , d) = f(〈xi,xj〉, d)) or the distance kernels (i.e.,
F (xi,xj , d) = f(‖xi−xj‖2, d)). It was shown there that under some assumptions on f and on the distributions
of xi’s, and in the “large d, large n” limit (i.e., and d, n → ∞ and d/n → (0,∞)): a) the non-linear kernel
matrix converges asymptotically in spectral norm to a linear kernel matrix, and b) there is a weak convergence of
the limiting spectral density. These results were recently strengthened in different directions by Cheng et al. [2]
and Do et al. [6]. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper investigating the non-asymptotic spectral
properties of a random kernel matrix.
Like the development of non-asymptotic theory of traditional random matrices has found multitude of ap-
plications in areas including statistics, geometric functional analysis, and compressed sensing [27], we believe
that the growth of a non-asymptotic theory of random kernel matrices will help in better understanding of many
machine learning applications that utilize kernel techniques.
The goal of private data analysis is to release global, statistical properties of a database while protecting the
privacy of the individuals whose information the database contains. Differential privacy [7] is a formal notion of
privacy tailored to private data analysis. Differential privacy requires, roughly, that any single individual’s data
have little effect on the outcome of the analysis. A lot of recent research has gone in developing differentially
private algorithms for various applications, including kernel methods [11]. A typical objective here is to release
as accurate an approximation as possible to some function f evaluated on a database D.
In this paper, we follow a complementary line of work that seeks to understand how much distortion (noise)
is necessary to privately release some particular function f evaluated on a database containing sensitive informa-
tion [5, 8, 9, 15, 4, 18, 3, 19, 14]. The general idea here, is to provide reconstruction attacks, which are attacks
that can reconstruct (almost all of) the sensitive part of database D given sufficiently accurate approximations to
f(D). Reconstruction attacks violate any reasonable notion of privacy (including, differential privacy), and the
existence of these attacks directly translate into lower bounds on distortion needed for privacy.
Linear reconstruction attacks were first considered in the context of data privacy by Dinur and Nissim [5], who
showed that any mechanism which answers≈ n log n random inner product queries on a database in {0, 1}n with
o(
√
n) noise per query is not private. Their attack was subsequently extended in various directions by [8, 9, 18, 3].
The results that are closest to our work are the attribute privacy lower bounds analyzed for releasing k-way
marginals [15, 4], linear/logistic regression parameters [14], and a subclass of statistical M -estimators [14].
Kasiviswanathan et al. [15] showed that, if d = Ω˜(n1/(k−1)), then any mechanism which releases all k-way
marginal tables with o(
√
n) noise per entry is attribute non-private.4 These noise bounds were improved by
De [4], who presented an attack that can tolerate a constant fraction of entries with arbitrarily high noise, as long
as the remaining entries have o(
√
n) noise. Kasiviswanathan et al. [14] recently showed that, if d = Ω(n), then
any mechanism which releases d different linear or logistic regression estimators each with o(1/
√
n) noise is
attribute non-private. They also showed that this lower bound extends to a subclass of statistical M -estimator
4The Ω˜ notation hides polylogarithmic factors.
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release problems. A point to observe is that in all the above referenced results, d has to be comparable to n, and
this dependency looks unavoidable in those results due to their use of least singular value bounds. However, in
this paper, our privacy lower bounds hold for all values of d, n (d could be n). Additionally, all the previous
reconstruction attack analyses critically require the xi’s to be drawn from product of univariate subgaussian
distributions, whereas our analysis here holds for any d-dimensional subgaussian distributions (not necessarily
product distributions), thereby is more widely applicable. The subgaussian assumption on the input data is quite
common in the analysis of machine learning algorithms [1].
2 Preliminaries
Notation. We use [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}. dH(·, ·) measures the Hamming distance. Vectors used
in the paper are by default column vectors and are denoted by boldface letters. For a vector v, v> denotes its
transpose and ‖v‖ denotes its Euclidean norm. For two vectors v1 and v2, 〈v1,v2〉 denotes the inner product of
v1 and v2. For a matrix M , ‖M‖ denotes its spectral norm, ‖M‖F denotes its Frobenius norm, and Mij denotes
its (i, j)th entry. In represents the identity matrix in dimension n. The unit sphere in d dimensions centered at
origin is denoted by Sd−1 = {z : ‖z‖ = 1, z ∈ Rd}. Throughout this paper C, c, C ′, also with subscripts,
denote absolute constants (i.e., independent of d and n), whose value may change from line to line.
2.1 Background on Kernel Methods
We provide a very brief introduction to the theory of kernel methods; see the many books on the topic [23, 24]
for further details.
Definition 1 (Kernel Function). Let X be a non-empty set. Then a function κ : X × X → R is called a kernel
function on X if there exists a Hilbert space H over R and a map φ : X → H such that for all x,y ∈ X , we
have
κ(x,y) = 〈φ(x), φ(y)〉H.
For any symmetric and positive semidefinite5 kernel κ, by Mercer’s theorem [17] there exists: (i) a unique
functional Hilbert space H (referred to as the reproducing kernel Hilbert space, Definition 2) on X such that
κ(·, ·) is the inner product in the space and (ii) a map φ defined as φ(x) := κ(·,x)6 that satisfies Definition 1.
The function φ is called the feature map and the spaceH is called the feature space.
Definition 2 (Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space). A kernel κ(·, ·) is a reproducing kernel of a Hilbert spaceH if
∀f ∈ H, f(x) = 〈κ(·,x), f(·)〉H. For a (compact) X ⊆ Rd, and a Hilbert spaceH of functions f : X → R, we
say H is a Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space if there ∃κ : X × X → R, s.t.: a) κ has the reproducing property,
and b) κ spansH = span{κ(·,x) : x ∈ X}.
A standard idea used in the machine-learning community (commonly referred to as the “kernel trick”) is that
kernels allow for the computation of inner-products in high-dimensional feature spaces (〈φ(x), φ(y)〉H) using
simple functions defined on pairs of input patterns (κ(x,y)), without knowing the φ mapping explicitly. This
trick allows one to efficiently solve a variety of non-linear optimization problems. Note that there is no restriction
on the dimension of the feature maps (φ(x)), i.e., it could be of infinite dimension.
Polynomial and Gaussian are two popular kernel functions that are used in many machine learning and data
mining tasks such as classification, regression, ranking, and structured prediction. Let the input space X = Rd.
For x,y ∈ Rd, these kernels are defined as:
5A positive definite kernel is a function κ : X × X → R such that for any n ≥ 1, for any finite set of points {xi}ni=1 in X and real
numbers {ai}ni=1, we have
∑n
i,j=1 aiajκ(xi,xj) ≥ 0.
6κ(·,x) is a vector with entries κ(x′,x) for all x′ ∈ X .
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(1) Polynomial Kernel: κ(x,y) = (a〈x,y〉 + b)p, with parameters a, b ∈ R and p ∈ N. Here a is referred
to as the slope parameter, b ≥ 0 trades off the influence of higher-order versus lower-order terms in the
polynomial, and p is the polynomial degree. For an input x ∈ Rd, the feature map φ(x) of the polynomial
kernel is a vector with a polynomial in d number of dimensions [23].
(2) Gaussian Kernel (also frequently referred to as the radial basis kernel): κ(x,y) = exp
(−a‖x− y‖2)
with real parameter a > 0. The value of a controls the locality of the kernel with low values indicating
that the influence of a single point is “far” and vice-versa [23]. An equivalent popular formulation, is to set
a = 1/2σ2, and hence, κ(x,y) = exp
(−‖x− y‖2/2σ2). For an input x ∈ Rd, the feature map φ(x) of
the Gaussian kernel is a vector of infinite dimensions [23]. Note that while we focus on the Gaussian kernel
in this paper, the extension of our results to other exponential kernels such as the Laplacian kernel (where
κ(x,y) = exp (−a‖x− y‖1)), is quite straightforward.
2.2 Background on Subgaussian Random Variables
Let us start by formally defining subgaussian random variables and vectors.
Definition 3 (Subgaussian Random Variable and Vector). We call a random variable x ∈ R subgaussian if there
exists a constant C > 0 if Pr[|x| > t] ≤ 2 exp(−t2/C2) for all t > 0. We say that a random vector x ∈ Rd is
subgaussian if the one-dimensional marginals 〈x,y〉 are subgaussian random variables for all y ∈ Rd.
The class of subgaussian random variables includes many random variables that arise naturally in data anal-
ysis, such as standard normal, Bernoulli, spherical, bounded (where the random variable x satisfies |x| ≤ M
almost surely for some fixed M ). The natural generalization of these random variables to higher dimension are
all subgaussian random vectors. For many isotropic convex sets7 K (such as the hypercube), a random vector x
uniformly distributed in K is subgaussian.
Definition 4 (Norm of Subgaussian Random Variable and Vector). The ψ2-norm of a subgaussian random vari-
able x ∈ R, denoted by ‖x‖ψ2 is:
‖x‖ψ2 = inf
{
t > 0 : E[exp(|x|2/t2)] ≤ 2} .
The ψ2-norm of a subgaussian random vector x ∈ Rd is:
‖x‖ψ2 = sup
y∈Sd−1
‖〈x,y〉‖ψ2 .
Claim 1 (Vershynin [27]). Let x ∈ Rd be a subgaussian random vector. Then there exists a constant C > 0,
such that Pr[|x| > t] ≤ 2 exp(−Ct2/‖x‖2ψ2).
Consider a subset T of Rd, and let  > 0. An -net of T is a subset N ⊆ T such that for every x ∈ T , there
exists a z ∈ N such that ‖x− z‖ ≤ . We would use the following well-known result about the size of -nets.
Proposition 2.1 (Bounding the size of an -Net [27]). Let T be a subset of Sd−1 and let  > 0. Then there exists
an -net of T of cardinality at most (1 + 2/)d.
The proof of the following claim follows by standard techniques.
Claim 2 ( [27]). Let N be a 1/2-net of Sd−1. Then for any x ∈ Rd, ‖x‖ ≤ 2 maxy∈N 〈x,y〉.
7A convex setK in Rd is called isotropic if a random vector chosen uniformly fromK according to the volume is isotropic. A random
vector x ∈ Rd is isotropic if for all y ∈ Rd, E[〈x,y〉2] = ‖y‖2.
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3 Largest Eigenvalue of Random Kernel Matrices
In this section, we provide the upper bound on the largest eigenvalue of a random kernel matrix, constructed
using polynomial or Gaussian kernels. Notice that the entries of a random kernel matrix are dependent. For
example any triplet of entries (i, j), (j, k) and (k, i) are mutually dependent. Additionally, we deal with vectors
drawn from general subgaussian distributions, and therefore, the coordinates within a random vector need not be
independent.
We start off with a simple lemma, to bound the Euclidean norm of a subgaussian random vector. A random
vector x is centered if E[x] = 0.
Lemma 3.1. Let x1, . . . ,xn ∈ Rd be independent centered subgaussian vectors. Then for all i ∈ [n], Pr[‖xi‖ ≥
C
√
d] ≤ exp(−C ′d) for constants C,C ′.
Proof. To this end, note that since xi is a subgaussian vector (from Definition 3)
Pr
[
|〈xi,y〉| ≥ C
√
d/2
]
≤ 2 exp(−C2d),
for constants C and C2, any unit vector y ∈ Sd−1. Taking the union bound over a (1/2)-net (N ) in Sd−1, and
using Proposition 2.1 for the size of the nets (which is at most 5d as  = 1/2), we get that
Pr
[
max
y∈N
|〈xi,y〉| ≥ C
√
d/2
]
≤ exp(−C3d),
From Claim 2, we know that ‖xi‖ ≤ 2 maxy∈N 〈xi,y〉. Hence, Pr
[
‖xi‖ ≥ C
√
d
]
≤ exp(−C ′d).
Polynomial Kernel. We now establish the bound on the spectral norm of a polynomial kernel random matrix.
We assume x1, . . . ,xn are independent vectors drawn according to a centered subgaussian distribution over Rd.
Let Kp denote the kernel matrix obtained using x1, . . . ,xn in a polynomial kernel. Our idea to split the kernel
matrix Kp into its diagonal and off-diagonal parts, and then bound the spectral norms of these two matrices
separately. The diagonal part contains independent entries of the form (a‖xi‖2 + b)p, and we use Lemma 3.1 to
bound its spectral norm. Dealing with the off-diagonal part of Kp is trickier because of the dependence between
the entries, and here we bound the spectral norm by its Frobenius norm. We also verify the upper bounds provided
in the following theorem by conducting numerical experiments (see Figure 1(a)).
Theorem 3.2. Let x1, . . . ,xn ∈ Rd be independent centered subgaussian vectors. Let p ∈ N, and let Kp be the
n × n matrix with (i, j)th entry Kpij = (a〈xi,xj〉 + b)p. Assume that n ≤ exp(C1d) for a constant C1. Then
there exists constants C0, C ′0 such that
Pr
[‖Kp‖ ≥ Cp0 |a|pdpn+ 2p+1|b|pn] ≤ exp(−C ′0d).
Proof. To prove the theorem, we split the kernel matrix Kp into the diagonal and off-diagonal parts. Let Kp =
D +W , where D represents the diagonal part of Kp and W the off-diagonal part of Kp. Note that
‖Kp‖ ≤ ‖D‖+ ‖W‖ ≤ ‖D‖+ ‖W‖F .
Let us estimate the norm of the diagonal part D first. From Lemma 3.1, we know that for all i ∈ [n] with
C3 = C
′,
Pr
[
‖xi‖ ≥ C
√
d
]
= Pr
[
‖xi‖2 ≥ (C
√
d)2
]
≤ exp(−C3d).
6
Instead of ‖x‖2i , we are interested in bounding (a‖xi‖2 + b)p.
Pr
[
‖xi‖2 ≥ (C
√
d)2
]
= Pr
[
(a‖xi‖2 + b)p ≥ (a(C
√
d)2 + b)p
]
. (1)
Consider (a(C
√
d)2 + b)p. A simple inequality to bound (a(C
√
d)2 + b)p is8
(a(C
√
d)2 + b)p ≤ 2p(|a|p(C
√
d)2p + |b|p).
Therefore,
Pr
[
(a‖xi‖2 + b)p ≥ 2p(|a|p(C
√
d)2p + |b|p)
]
≤ Pr
[
(a‖xi‖2 + b)p ≥ (a(C
√
d)2 + b)p
]
.
Using (1) and substituting in the above equation, for any i ∈ [n]
Pr
[
(a‖xi‖2 + b)p ≥ 2p(|a|pC2pdp + |b|p)
] ≤ Pr [‖xi‖ ≥ C√d] ≤ exp(−C3d).
By applying a union bound over all n non-zero entries in D, we get that for all i ∈ [n]
Pr
[
(a‖xi‖2 + b)p ≥ 2p(|a|pC2pdp + |b|p)
] ≤ n · exp(−C3d) ≤ exp(C1d) · exp(−C3d) ≤ exp(−C4d),
as we assumed that n ≤ exp(C1d). This implies that
Pr[‖D‖ ≥ 2p(|a|pC2pdp + |b|p)] ≤ exp(−C4d). (2)
We now bound the spectral norm of the off-diagonal part W using Frobenius norm as an upper bound on the
spectral norm. Firstly note that for any y ∈ Rd, the random variable 〈xi,y〉 is subgaussian with its ψ2-norm at
most C5‖y‖ for some constant C5. This follows as:
‖〈xi,y〉‖ψ2 := inf
{
t > 0 : E[exp(〈xi,y〉2/t2)] ≤ 2
} ≤ C5‖y‖.
Therefore, for a fixed xj , ‖〈xi,xj〉‖ψ2 ≤ C5‖xj‖. For i 6= j, conditioning on xj ,
Pr [|〈xi,xj〉| ≥ τ ] = Exj [Pr [|〈xi,xj〉| ≥ τ | xj ]] .
From Claim 1,
Exj [Pr [|〈xi,xj〉| ≥ τ | xj ]] ≤ Exj
[
exp
(
−C6τ2
‖〈xi,xj〉‖2ψ2
)]
≤ Exj
[
exp
( −C6τ2
(C5‖xj‖)2
)]
= Exj
[
exp
(−C7τ2
‖xj‖2
)]
,
where the last inequality uses the fact that ‖〈xi,xj〉‖ψ2 ≤ C5‖xj‖. Now let us condition the above expectation
on the value of ‖xj‖ based on whether ‖xj‖ ≥ C
√
d or ‖xj‖ < C
√
d. We can rewrite
Exj
[−C7τ2
‖xj‖2
]
≤ Exj
[
exp
(−C7τ2
C2d
) ∣∣∣∣∣ ‖xj‖ < C√d
]
Pr[‖xj‖ < C
√
d]
+ Exj
[
exp
(−C7τ2
‖xj‖2
) ∣∣∣∣∣ ‖xj‖ ≥ C√d
]
Pr[‖xj‖ ≥ C
√
d].
8For any a, b,m ∈ R and p ∈ N, (a ·m+ b)p ≤ 2p(|a|p|m|p + |b|p).
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The above equation can be easily be simplified as:
Exj
[−C7τ2
‖xj‖2
]
≤ exp
(−C8τ2
d
)
+ Exj
[
exp
(−C7τ2
‖xj‖2
) ∣∣∣∣∣ ‖xj‖ ≥ C√d
]
Pr[‖xj‖ ≥ C
√
d].
From Lemma 3.1, Pr[‖xj‖ ≥ C
√
d] ≤ exp(−C3d), and
Exj
[
exp
(−C7τ2
‖xj‖2
) ∣∣∣∣∣ ‖xj‖ ≥ C√d
]
≤ 1.
This implies that as Pr[‖xj‖ ≥ C
√
d] ≤ exp(−C3d)),
Exj
[
exp
(−C7τ2
‖xj‖2
) ∣∣∣∣∣ ‖xj‖ ≥ C√d
]
Pr[‖xj‖ ≥ C
√
d] ≤ exp(−C3d).
Putting the above arguments together,
Pr [|〈xi,xj〉| ≥ τ ] = Exj [Pr [|〈xi,xj〉| ≥ τ | xj ]] ≤ exp
(−C8τ2
d
)
+ exp(−C3d).
Taking a union bound over all (n2 − n) < n2 non-zero entries in W ,
Pr
[
max
i 6=j
|〈xi,xj〉| ≥ τ
]
≤ n2
(
exp
(−C8τ2
d
)
+ exp(−C3d)
)
.
Setting τ = C · d in the above and using the fact that n ≤ exp(C1d),
Pr
[
max
i 6=j
|〈xi,xj〉| ≥ C · d
]
≤ exp(−C9d). (3)
We are now ready to bound the Frobenius norm of W .
‖W‖F =
∑
i 6=j
(a〈xi,xj〉+ b)2p
1/2 ≤ (n222p (|a|2p〈xi,xj〉2p + |b|2p))1/2 ≤ n2p (|a|p|〈xi,xj〉|p + |b|p) .
Plugging in the probabilistic bound on |〈xi,xj〉| from (3) gives,
Pr [‖W‖F ≥ n2p (|a|p|Cpdp + |b|p)] ≤ Pr [n2p (|a|p|〈xi,xj〉|p + |b|p) ≥ n2p (|a|p|Cpdp + |b|p)]
≤ exp(−C9d). (4)
Plugging bounds on ‖D‖ (from (2)) and ‖W‖F (from (4)) to upper bound ‖Kp‖ ≤ ‖D‖ + ‖W‖F yields that
there exists constants C0 and C ′0 such that,
Pr
[‖Kp‖ ≥ Cp0 |a|pdpn+ 2p+1|b|pn] ≤ Pr [‖D‖+ ‖W‖F ≥ Cp0 |a|pdpn+ 2p+1|b|pn] ≤ exp(−C ′0d).
This completes the proof of the theorem. The chain of constants can easily be estimated starting with the constant
in the definition of the subgaussian random variable.
Remark: Note that for our proofs it is only necessary that x1, . . . ,xn are independent random vectors, but
they need not be identically distributed. This spectral norm upper bound on Kp (again with exponentially high
probability) could be improved to
O
(
Cp0 |a|p(dp + dp/2n) + 2p+1n|b|p
)
,
with a slightly more involved analysis (omitted in this extended abstract). For an even p, the expectation of every
individual entry of the matrix Kp is positive, which provides tight examples for this bound.
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Gaussian Kernel. We now establish the bound on the spectral norm of a Gaussian kernel random matrix. Again
assume x1, . . . ,xn are independent vectors drawn according to a centered subgaussian distribution over Rd. Let
Kg denote the kernel matrix obtained using x1, . . . ,xn in a Gaussian kernel. Here an upper bound of n on the
spectral norm on the kernel matrix follows trivially as all entries of Kg are less than equal to 1. We show that this
bound is tight, in that for small values of a, with high probability the spectral norm is at least Ω(n).
In fact, it is impossible to obtain better than O(n) upper bound on the spectral norm of Kg without additional
assumptions on the subgaussian distribution, as illustrated by this example: Consider a distribution over Rd,
such that a random vector drawn from this distribution is a zero vector (0)d with probability 1/2 and uniformly
distributed over the sphere in Rd of radius 2
√
d with probability 1/2. A random vector x drawn from this
distribution is isotropic and subgaussian, but Pr[x = (0)d] = 1/2. Therefore, in x1, . . . ,xn drawn from this
distribution, with high probability more than a constant fraction of the vectors will be (0)d. This means that a
proportional number of entries of the matrix Kg will be 1, and the norm will be O(n) regardless of a.
This situation changes, however, when we add the additional assumption that x1, . . . ,xn have independent
centered subgaussian coordinates9 (i.e., each xi is drawn from a product distribution formed from some d centered
univariate subgaussian distributions). In that case, the kernel matrix Kg is a small perturbation of the identity
matrix, and we show that the spectral norm of Kg is with high probability bounded by an absolute constant (for
a = Ω(log n/d)). For this proof, similar to Theorem 3.2, we split the kernel matrix into its diagonal and off-
diagonal parts. The spectral norm of the off-diagonal part is again bounded by its Frobenius norm. We also verify
the upper bounds presented in the following theorem by conducting numerical experiments (see Figure 1(b)).
Theorem 3.3. Let x1, . . . ,xn ∈ Rd be independent centered subgaussian vectors. Let a > 0, and let Kg be the
n×n matrix with (i, j)th entry Kgij = exp(−a‖xi−xj‖2). Then there exists constants c, c0, c′0, c1 such that
a) ‖Kg‖ ≤ n.
b) If a < c1/d, Pr [‖Kg‖ ≥ c0n] ≥ 1− exp(−c′0n).
c) If all the vectors x1, . . . ,xn satisfy the additional assumption of having independent centered subgaussian
coordinates, and assume n ≤ exp(C1d) for a constant C1. Then for any δ > 0 and a ≥ (2 + δ) lognd ,
Pr [‖Kg‖ ≥ 2] ≤ exp(−cζ2d) with ζ > 0 depending only on δ.
Proof. Proof of Part a) is straightforward as all entries of Kg do not exceed 1.
Let us prove the lower estimate for the norm in Part b). For i = 1, . . . , n define
Zi =
n∑
j=n
2
+1
Kgij .
From Lemma 3.1 for all i ∈ [n], Pr
[
‖xi‖ ≥ C
√
d
]
≤ exp(−C ′d). In other words, ‖xi‖ is less than C
√
d for
all i ∈ [d] with probability at least 1− exp(−C ′d). Let us call this event E1. Under E1 and assumption a < c1/d,
E[Zi] ≥ c2n and E[Z2i ] ≤ c3n2. Therefore, by Paley-Zygmund inequality (under event E1),
Pr[Zi ≥ c4n] ≥ c5. (5)
NowZ1, . . . , Zn are not independent random variables. But if we condition on xn/2+1, . . . ,xn, thenZ1, . . . , Zn/2
become independent (for simplicity, assume that n is divisible by 2). Thereafter, an application of Chernoff bound
onZ1, . . . , Zn/2 using the probability bound from (5) (under conditioning on xn/2+1, . . . ,xn and event E1) gives:
Pr
[
Zi ≥ c4n for at least c5n entries Zi ∈ {Z1, . . . , Zn/2}
] ≥ 1− exp(−c6n).
9Some of the commonly used subgaussian random vectors such as the standard normal, Bernoulli satisfy this additional assumption.
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The first conditioning can be removed by taking the expectation with respect to xn/2+1, . . . ,xn without disturbing
the exponential probability bound. Similarly, conditioning on event E1 can also be easily removed.
Let K ′g be the submatrix of Kg consisting of rows 1 ≤ i ≤ n/2 and columns n/2 + 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Note that
‖K ′g‖ ≥ u>K ′gu, where u =
(√
2
n , . . . ,
√
2
n
)
(of dimension n/2). Then
Pr[‖Kg‖ ≤ c0n] ≤ Pr[‖K ′g‖ ≤ c7n] ≤ Pr[u>K ′gu ≤ c7n]
Pr
 2
n
n/2∑
i=1
Zi ≤ c7n
 ≤ exp(−c′0n).
The last line follows as from above arguments with exponentially high probability above more than Ω(n) entries
in Z1, . . . , Zn/2 are greater than Ω(n), and by readjusting the constants.
Proof of Part c): As in Theorem 3.2, we split the matrix Kg into the diagonal (D) and the off-diagonal part
(W ) (i.e., Kg = D + W ). It is simple to observe that D = In, therefore we just concentrate on W . The
(i, j)th entry in W is exp(−a‖xi − xj‖2), where xi and xj are independent vectors with independent centered
subgaussian coordinates. Therefore, we can use Hoeffding’s inequality, for fixed i, j,
Pr
[
exp(−a‖xi − xj‖2) ≥ exp(−a(1− ζ)d)
]
= Pr
[‖xi − xj‖2
d
≤ (1− ζ)
]
≤ exp(−c8ζ2d), (6)
where we used the fact that if a random variable is subgaussian then its square is a subexponential random
variable [27].10 To estimate the norm of W , we bound it by its Frobenius norm. If a ≥ (2 + δ) lognd , then we can
choose ζ > 0 depending on δ such that n2 exp(−a(1− ζ)d) ≤ 1. Hence,
Pr[‖Kg‖ ≥ 2] ≤ Pr[‖D‖+ ‖W‖F ≥ 2] = Pr[‖W‖F ≥ 1]
= Pr
 ∑
1≤i,j≤n,i6=j
exp(−a‖xi − xj‖2) ≥ 1

≤ Pr
 ∑
1≤i,j≤n,i6=j
exp(−a‖xi − xj‖2) ≥ n2 exp(−a(1− ζ)d)

≤ Pr
 ∑
1≤i,j≤n
exp(−a‖xi − xj‖2) ≥ n2 exp(−a(1− ζ)d)

≤ n2 Pr
[
max
1≤i,j≤n
exp(−a‖xi − xj‖2) ≥ exp(−a(1− ζ)d)
]
≤ n2 exp(−c8ζ2d)
≤ exp(−cζ2d) for some constant c.
The first equality follows as ‖D‖ = 1, and the second-last inequality follows from (6). This completes the
proof of the theorem. Again the long chain of constants can easily be estimated starting with the constant in the
definition of the subgaussian random variable.
Remark: Note that again the xi’s need not be identically distributed. Also as mentioned earlier, the analysis in
Theorem 3.3 could easily be extended to other exponential kernels such as the Laplacian kernel.
10We call a random variable x ∈ R subexponential if there exists a constant C > 0 if Pr[|x| > t] ≤ 2 exp(−t/C) for all t > 0.
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Figure 1: Largest eigenvalue distribution for random kernel matrices constructed with a polynomial kernel (left plot) and
a Gaussian kernel (right plot). The actual value plots are constructed by averaging over 100 runs, and in each run we
draw n independent standard Gaussian vectors in d = 100 dimensions. The predicted values are computed from bounds in
Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 (Part c). The kernel matrix size n is varied from 10 to 10000 in multiples of 10. For the polynomial
kernel, we set a = 1, b = 1, and p = 4, and for the Gaussian kernel a = 3 log(n)/d. Note that our upper bounds are fairly
close to the actual results. For the Gaussian kernel, the actual values are very close to 1.
4 Application: Privately Releasing Kernel Ridge Regression Coefficients
We consider an application of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 to obtain noise lower bounds for privately releasing coeffi-
cients of kernel ridge regression. For privacy violation, we consider a generalization of blatant non-privacy [5]
referred to as attribute non-privacy (formalized in [15]). Consider a databaseD ∈ Rn×d+1 that contains, for each
individual i, a sensitive attribute yi ∈ {0, 1} as well as some other information xi ∈ Rd which is assumed to be
known to the attacker. The ith record is thus (xi, yi). Let X ∈ Rn×d be a matrix whose ith row is xi, and let
y = (y1, . . . , yn). We denote the entire database D = (X|y) where | represents vertical concatenation. Given
some released information ρ, the attacker constructs an estimate yˆ that she hopes is close to y. We measure the
attack’s success in terms of the Hamming distance dH(y, yˆ). A scheme is not attribute private if an attacker can
consistently get an estimate that is within distance o(n). Formally:
Definition 5 (Failure of Attribute Privacy [15]). A (randomized) mechanismM : Rn×d+1 → Rl is said to allow
(θ, γ) attribute reconstruction if there exists a setting of the nonsensitive attributes X ∈ Rn×d and an algorithm
(adversary) A : Rn×d × Rl → Rn such that for every y ∈ {0, 1}n,
Pr
ρ←M((X|y))
[A(X, ρ) = yˆ : dH(y, yˆ) ≤ θ] ≥ 1− γ.
Asymptotically, we say that a mechanism is attribute nonprivate if there is an infinite sequence of n for which
M allows (o(n), o(1))-reconstruction. Here d = d(n) is a function of n. We say the attack A is efficient if it
runs in time poly(n, d).
Kernel Ridge Regression Background. One of the most basic regression formulation is that of ridge regres-
sion [10]. Suppose that we are given a dataset {(xi, yi)}ni=1 consisting of n points with xi ∈ Rd and yi ∈ R.
Here xi’s are referred to as the regressors and yi’s are the response variables. In linear regression the task is
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to find a linear function that models the dependencies between xi’s and the yi’s. A common way to prevent
overfitting in linear regression is by adding a penalty regularization term (also known as shrinkage in statistics).
In kernel ridge regression [21], we assume a model of form y = f(x) + ξ, where we are trying to estimate the
regression function f and ξ is some unknown vector that accounts for discrepancy between the actual response
(y) and predicted outcome (f(x)). Given a reproducing kernel Hilbert space H with kernel κ, the goal of ridge
regression kernel ridge regression is to estimate the unknown function f? such the least-squares loss defined over
the dataset with a weighted penalty based on the squared Hilbert norm is minimized.
Kernel Ridge Regression: argminf∈H
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − f(xi))2 + λ‖f‖2H
)
, (7)
where λ > 0 is a regularization parameter. By representer theorem [22], any solution f? for (7), takes the form
f?(·) =
n∑
i=1
αiκ(·,xi), (8)
where α = (α1, . . . , αn) is known as the kernel ridge regression coefficient vector. Plugging this representation
into (7) and solving the resulting optimization problem (in terms of α now), we get that the minimum value is
achieved for α = α?, where
α? = (K + λIn)−1y, where K is the kernel matrix with Kij = κ(xi,xj) and y = (y1, . . . , yn). (9)
Plugging this α? from (9) in to (8), gives the final form for estimate f?(·). This means that for a new point
x ∈ Rd, the predicted response is f?(x) = ∑ni=1 α?i κ(x,xi) where α? = (K+λIn)−1y and α? = (α?1, . . . , α?n).
Therefore, knowledge of α? and x1, . . . ,xn suffices for using the regression model for making future predictions.
If K is constructed using a polynomial kernel (defined in (1)) then the above procedure is referred to as the
polynomial kernel ridge regression, and similarly if K is constructed using a Gaussian kernel (defined in (2))
then the above procedure is referred to as the Gaussian kernel ridge regression.
Reconstruction Attack from Noisy α∗. Algorithm 1 outlines the attack. The privacy mechanism releases a
noisy approximation to α?. Let α˜ be this noisy approximation, i.e., α˜ = α? + e where e is some unknown noise
vector. The adversary tries to reconstruct an approximation yˆ of y from α˜. The adversary solves the following
`2-minimization problem to construct yˆ:
minz∈Rn‖α˜− (K + λIn)−1z‖. (10)
In the setting of attribute privacy, the database D = (X|y). Let x1, . . . ,xn be the rows of X , using which the
adversary can construct K to carry out the attack. Since the matrix K + λIn is invertible for λ > 0 as K is a
positive semidefinite matrix, the solution to (10) is simply z = (K + λIn)α˜, element-wise rounding of which to
closest 0, 1 gives yˆ.
Lemma 4.1. Let α˜ = α? + e, where e ∈ Rn is some unknown (noise) vector. If ‖e‖∞ ≤ β (absolute value of all
entries in e is less than β), then yˆ returned by Algorithm 1 satisfies, dH(y, yˆ) ≤ 4(K + λ)2β2n. In particular,
if β = o
(
1
‖K‖+λ
)
, then dH(y, yˆ) = o(n).
Proof. Since α? = (K + λIn)−1y, α˜ = (K + λIn)−1y + e. Now multiplying (K + λIn) on both sides gives,
(K + λIn)α˜ = y + (K + λIn)e.
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Algorithm 1 Reconstruction Attack from Noisy Kernel Ridge Regression Coefficients
Input: Public information X ∈ Rn×d, regularization parameter λ, and α˜ (noisy version of α? defined in (9)).
1: Let x1, . . . ,xn be the rows of X , construct the kernel matrix K with Kij = κ(xi,xj)
2: Return yˆ = (yˆ1, . . . , yˆn) defined as follows:
yˆi =
{
0 if ith entry in (K + λIn)α˜ < 1/2
1 otherwise
Concentrate on ‖(K + λIn)e‖. This can be bound as
‖(K + λIn)e‖ ≤ ‖(K + λIn)‖‖e‖ = (‖K‖+ λ)‖e‖.
If the absolute value of all the entries in e are less than β then ‖e‖ ≤ β√n. A simple manipulation then shows
that if the above hold then (K + λIn)e cannot have more than 4(‖K‖ + λ)2β2n entries with absolute value
above 1/2. Since yˆ and y only differ in those entries where (K + λIn)e is greater than 1/2, it follows that
dH(y, yˆ) ≤ 4(‖K‖+ λ)2β2n. Setting β = o( 1‖K‖+λ) implies dH(y, yˆ) = o(n).
For a privacy mechanism to be attribute non-private, the adversary has to be able reconstruct an 1 − o(1)
fraction of y with high probability. Using the above lemma, and the different bounds on ‖K‖ established in The-
orems 3.2 and 3.3, we get the following lower bounds for privately releasing kernel ridge regression coefficients.
Proposition 4.2. 1) Any privacy mechanism which for every database D = (X|y) where X ∈ Rn×d and
y ∈ {0, 1}n releases the coefficient vector of a polynomial kennel ridge regression model (for constants a, b,
and p) fitted between X (matrix of regressor values) and y (response vector), by adding o( 1dpn+λ) noise to
each coordinate is attribute non-private. The attack that achieves this attribute privacy violation operates in
O(dn2) time.
2) Any privacy mechanism which for every database D = (X|y) where X ∈ Rn×d and y ∈ {0, 1}n releases
the coefficient vector of a Gaussian kennel ridge regression model (for constant a) fitted between X (matrix of
regressor values) and y (response vector), by adding o( 12+λ) noise to each coordinate is attribute non-private.
The attack that achieves this attribute privacy violation operates in O(dn2) time.
Proof. For Part 1, draw each individual i’s non-sensitive attribute vector xi independently from any d-dimensional
subgaussian distribution, and use Lemma 4.1 in conjunction with Theorem 3.2.
For Part 2, draw each individual i’s non-sensitive attribute vector xi independently from any product distribu-
tion formed from some d centered univariate subgaussian distributions, and use Lemma 4.1 in conjunction with
Theorem 3.3 (Part c).11
The time needed to construct the kernel matrix K is O(dn2), which dominates the overall computation
time.
We can ask how the above distortion needed for privacy compares to typical entries in α?. The answer is
not simple, but there are natural settings of inputs, where the noise needed for privacy becomes comparable with
coordinates of α?, implying that the privacy comes at a steep price. One such example is if the xi’s are drawn
11Note that it is not critical for xi’s to be drawn from a product distribution. It is possible to analyze the attack even under a (weaker) as-
sumption that each individual i’s non-sensitive attribute vector xi is drawn independently from a d-dimensional subgaussian distribution,
by using Lemma 4.1 in conjunction with Theorem 3.3 (Part a).
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from the standard normal distribution, y = (1)n, and all other kernel parameters are constant, then the expected
value of the corresponding α? coordinates match the noise bounds obtained in Proposition 4.2.
Note that Proposition 4.2 makes no assumptions on the dimension d of the data, and holds for all values
of n, d. This is different from all other previous lower bounds for attribute privacy [15, 4, 14], all of which
require d to be comparable to n, thereby holding only either when the non-sensitive data (the xi’s) are very high-
dimensional or for very small n. Also all the previous lower bound analyses [15, 4, 14] critically rely on the fact
that the individual coordinates of each of the xi’s are independent12, which is not essential for Proposition 4.2.
Note on `1-reconstruction Attacks. A natural alternative to (10) is to use `1-minimization (also known as “LP
decoding”). This gives rise to the following linear program:
minz∈Rn‖α˜− (K + λIn)−1z‖1. (11)
In the context of privacy, the `1-minimization approach was first proposed by Dwork et al. [8], and recently
reanalyzed in different contexts by [4, 14]. These results have shown that, for some settings, the `1-minimization
can handle considerably more complex noise patterns than the `2-minimization. However, in our setting, since
the solutions for (11) and (10) are exactly the same (z = (K + λIn)α˜), there is no inherent advantage of using
the `1-minimization.
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